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most notably those made available with the Recovery 
Fund, support and boost economic, technological, social 
and cultural development.
Can the European economic recovery be knowledge-
intensive?
One of the key priorities aimed at enhancing the European 
economy is that of bridging the scientifi c and technologi-
cal gap of the EU vis-à-vis the United States and Japan, 
as these competencies are needed to sustain rising in-
dustries. We know that the EU is composed of very het-
erogeneous countries; while research and development 
(R&D) intensity, i.e. R&D expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP, is high in some member states, others are lagging. 
Overall, the EU has a lower R&D intensity than the US and 
Japan and it is now challenged by emerging countries 
such as China (see Figure 1).
For several decades, the EU has carried out a battery of 
actions to enhance education, science, technology and 
innovation. Specifi cally, the EU Framework Programmes 
started in 1984 and tried to foster European capabilities 
in promising technological areas. Among them, a cru-
cial role has been devoted to supporting information and 
communication technology (ICT) clusters, perhaps be-
cause they were considered an enabling technology on 
which the overall economic prosperity depended. How-
There is a consensus that Europe will start a solid recov-
ery after the COVID-19 crisis only if supported by remark-
able direct government intervention. The existing policy 
instruments at the national and European levels, and 
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that a cluster of new fi rms that are able to contribute to 
the generation of technological opportunities and, above 
all, the capacity to transform them into viable commercial 
products, processes and services, may be needed.
To prove our point, a comparison with China is certainly 
instructive. China has substantially increased the re-
sources devoted to education, R&D and innovation; but to 
exploit this investment economically, it is bolstering new 
companies able to compete with big tech American cor-
porations, especially in new strategic industries. In com-
parison, the EU response is much feebler.
The following section briefl y outlines the EU strategies 
and efforts aimed at enhancing technological capabili-
ties. The possibilities for Europe to set up large public 
corporations to enable technologies are then explored, 
including two previous experiences, the Concorde and 
the Airbus cases. Finally, the article explains how to iden-
tify the most promising emerging sectors, with a special 
focus on the European Battery Alliance.
The EU regional dimension in scientifi c and 
technological capabilities
The EU’s problem is that it is a highly heterogeneous area. 
It differentiates from the US or China in that it does not 
have the powerful governance devices that characterise 
nation states yet. The various Framework Programmes 
were forced to balance two opposite objectives. On the 
one hand, their goal was to enhance the scientifi c and 
technological competencies of the core areas to sup-
port European industry’s competitiveness against foreign 
countries. On the other hand, they aimed to foster the de-
velopment of competencies in the catching-up areas.
Regional imbalances in technological capabilities in the 
EU are very severe. Whereas some timid signs of con-
vergence have occurred because of the Framework Pro-
grammes, regions’ contributions to the overall generation 
of new knowledge are very asymmetric (Archibugi et al., 
2021). Eastern European countries, despite their attempt 
to better integrate into the overall EU scientifi c and tech-
nological communities, have registered small signs of 
progress in enhancing their innovative capacity. This 
indicates that the transition from a planned to a market 
economy has been harder than expected, especially con-
cerning technological developments. Southern European 
regions continue to lag behind the Northern European 
countries and have accumulated increased delays in the 
aftermath of the 2008 crisis.
Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that having a 
strong, infl uential network position in collaborative EU 
ever, the gap with the US is still substantial. The Frame-
work Programmes have played a crucial role in creating 
capabilities across the old continent, also allowing inte-
gration and intra-European collaboration among fi rms 
and universities, but they have not managed to close the 
gap, nor could they have achieved such a demanding task 
on their own.
The overall economic consequences of the 2008 fi nancial 
crisis have also affected science and technology. The EU 
level of investment – one of the main engines of innovation 
– was still below its 2008 level when the COVID-19 crisis 
broke out. In many EU member countries, public invest-
ment, rather than acting anti-cyclically, decreased even 
more than the business investment. The EU tried to sus-
tain the total level of investment with the European Fund 
for Strategic Investments, but this also proved to be insuf-
fi cient (Archibugi et al., 2020).
The current and post-COVID-19 instruments, includ-
ing the European Recovery Fund, will eventually provide 
massive resources to support public investment plans 
and a substantial part will be devoted to R&D and innova-
tion. But the bulk of these resources will be managed by 
national authorities under European Commission supervi-
sion and not, like the Framework Programmes, directly by 
the European Commission.
This article asks the question: Can the EU fi ll the tech-
nology gap through public investments and incentives to 
R&D and innovation without also attempting to create en-
terprises in high-tech industries? We doubt it. Our view 
is that the interventions aimed at fi nancing and support-
ing the activities of the existing institutions and fi rms are 
certainly useful, yet this may not be enough. We suggest 
Figure 1
R&D intensity and gross domestic expenditure in 
China, Japan, the EU and the US, 2000-2018
percentage of GDP; and total amount in billions of US dollars (size of the 
circles)
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• challenge the dominance of the US and China by en-
hancing the excellence of selected players and areas.
The Horizon 2020 project, which just ended, was one 
of the world’s largest public schemes supporting new 
knowledge development. Despite the massive resources 
made available by the EU to enhance scientifi c and tech-
nological capabilities, especially in enabling technolo-
gies, they merely corresponded to the yearly equivalent 
budget of the R&D investment of large corporations. 
While the Horizon 2020 yearly budget was about €13.2 
billion, large corporations such as Amazon (€21.2 billion), 
Alphabet (€18.3 billion), Samsung (€14.8 billion), Micro-
soft (€14.7 billion), Volkswagen (€13.6 billion) or Huawei 
(€12.7 billion) alone spend more or comparable amounts 
(see Table 1).
Horizon Europe is an excellent fi nancial instrument to 
generate and disseminate competencies across the EU, 
however, it will not be able to single-handedly create a 
genuine industrial capacity to allow the EU to be a world-
leading player in emerging technologies.
Can the EU set up large corporations in enabling 
technologies?
There is widespread consensus that the state should be a 
vigilant referee of the competitive process through regu-
lations and antitrust policies. In contrast, there is much 
more debate on its role as a direct economic player in a 
research greatly affects participation in Horizon 2020 
projects (Enger, 2018). The presence of these “closed 
clubs” has often been at the expense of the less infl uential 
higher education institutions located predominantly in the 
periphery of Europe, leading to a vicious spiral in which 
established institutions have acquired more funds and re-
inforced their position.
The EU has a tough choice to make. On the one hand, it 
should foster EU scientifi c excellence and technological ca-
pabilities vis-à-vis a fi ercer global competition with estab-
lished countries like the US and Japan and emerging coun-
tries like China and India. On the other hand, it should also 
increase EU cohesion by reducing technological disparities 
across its regions and industries. The two objectives are 
somehow in confl ict with each other. While the former may 
require a further concentration of competencies in the most 
emancipated areas to compete with leading technological 
hubs such as Silicon Valley, Route 128, Samsung town or 
Shenzhen, the latter may nurture capabilities of the least 
developed regions and sectors.
What are the instruments available at the EU level? One of 
the most relevant is certainly the Framework Programmes 
and it is very likely that the coming Horizon Europe (2021-
27) will have to ponder two choices:
• reduce disparities by fostering the distribution of 
knowledge in peripheral areas and comparatively 
weaker sectors
Table 1
Top corporations’ R&D expenditure in 2018 compared to Horizon 2020 average budget
Sources: Elaborations on the EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard (2019) and EU Expenditure and Revenue 2014-2020. For Amazon, we use the data 
provided by Skillicorn (2020).








1 Amazon General retailers 21.20 647.50 773.52
2 Alphabet US Software and computer services 18.27 98.77 321.57
3 Samsung Electronics South Korea Electronic and electrical equipment 14.83 309.63 243.46
4 Microsoft US Software and computer services 14.74 144.00 752.29
5 Volkswagen Germany Automobiles and parts 13.64 664.50 40.81
Horizon 2020 EU 13.26
6 Huawei Investment & Holding Co. China Technology hardware and equipment 12.74 188.00
7 Apple US Technology hardware and equipment 12.43 132.00 960.21
8 Intel US Technology hardware and equipment 11.83 107.40 195
9 Roche Switzerland Pharmaceuticals and biotechnology 9.80 94.44 150.05
10 Johnson & Johnson US Pharmaceuticals and biotechnology 9.41 135.10 315.58
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tary leaders, they lacked this capacity. The vulnerability 
of the European industry, specifi cally in aircraft, created 
the political environment to build up such new ventures. 
Many commentators believed that without them, Western 
Europe would have been marginalised in the international 
division of labour (see, for instance, the infl uential book 
by Servan-Schreiber, 1968).
The launch of the Concorde by Aerospatiale (France) and 
BAe (UK) – a jet engine passenger aircraft developed 
during the 1960s and introduced in 1969 – was one of 
the fi rst-ever collaborations within the European context, 
even if it took place outside the institutions of the Euro-
pean Economic Community (in 1969 the UK was not yet 
a member of the European Economic Community). The 
Concorde was born because the French and British em-
pires joined their forces to compete with the Soviet Tu-
polev Tu-144 to produce supersonic transport aircraft. 
This collaboration is indeed an example of a combination 
of two existing national trajectories. At the time, France 
was specialised in jet technology (for military purposes) 
and the UK had a long record in the passenger market.
While Concorde was a technological success, it ended 
up being an economic failure. Only 20 airplanes were 
manufactured, seven of which were acquired by Brit-
ish Airways and seven by Air France, the respective fl ag 
carrier airlines. Although the product was well designed 
and prestigious, it turned out to be a commercial fi asco, 
mainly due to its impressive consumption and mainte-
nance costs.
The second example is the European Airbus consortium, 
which started developing aircraft in the 1970s. Airbus has 
been economically successful and, after half a century, 
has managed to create a dominant European fi rm in the 
industry. Set up as a French-German venture in 1969, 
Airbus rapidly became a transnational consortium involv-
ing Aerospatiale and BAe, the German fi rm DASA and the 
Spanish fi rm CASA. Even this venture developed outside 
the institutions of the European Economic Community. Its 
success has paved the way for new European networks, 
such as Avions de Transport Regional, and recently Aero 
International Regional.1
Airbus challenged the American incumbent airplane man-
ufacturers, all subsidised for military purposes (Boeing, 
Lockheed and McDonnell Douglas). Similarly, European 
governments responded with subsidies for R&D, fi scal in-
1 In military aircraft, European collaborations date back to Panavia, 
established in 1969, and extended to Eurofi ghter and Europatrol. 
Similarly, European Helicopter Industry and Eurocopter have become 
prominent leaders in the European helicopter industry.
market economy. A daring perspective is that European 
governments should actively participate in the decisions 
concerning industrial policy strategies, rather than sim-
ply act as a regulator (see for example Cimoli et al. (2015) 
and the other contributors to the same Intereconomics 
Forum). There are several industrial policies that govern-
ments carry out to reinforce the presence in innovative 
industries (Edler and Fagerberg, 2017). But the EU as a 
whole, with the support of national governments, should 
attempt to add another economic policy instrument, 
namely the generation of new fi rms in the emerging and 
enabling technologies.
“National champions”, i.e. large corporations able to 
compete in the global markets, need the support of a 
proper national government to survive (Strange, 1991), 
especially if they are associated with complex knowl-
edge infrastructures (Mazzucato, 2013). But fresh national 
champions would have insuffi cient strength to compete 
with the incumbent American and Chinese corporations, 
particularly because they may receive political protection 
from the government of their country only. Fast-growing 
European companies and start-ups, especially in the ICT 
and related sectors, could easily be acquired by the big-
gest companies in terms of market capitalisation (market 
value) and liquid assets (see Rikap and Lundvall, 2020). 
American Big Tech have already acquired promising Eu-
ropean start-ups, a strategy that is widely used to obtain 
quick and easy access to new technologies and retain 
market dominance (Marks, 2017). If new start-ups are ac-
quired by foreign big-tech fi rms, they will indirectly pro-
vide public support for the technological advancement 
of foreign competitors. As shown in Table 1, none of the 
largest spenders on R&D with gigantic market capitalisa-
tion are based in Europe.
The policy implication is quite straightforward: To become 
a challenger in high technology, we need new publicly 
supported corporations at the continental level. Have Eu-
ropean countries ever joined forces to create companies 
able to enter new industries and compete with the US? 
Rarely, but there are two important cases to recall: Con-
corde, which started as a French-British venture in 1969, 
and Airbus, which began as a French-German venture 
also in 1969.
Lessons from the past: Concorde and Airbus
In the 1960s, European governments decided to produce 
airplanes as a third player to challenge their two domi-
nant rivals, the US and the Soviet Union. The two super-
powers developed competitive airplanes for military pur-
poses and subsequently adopted them to civilian trans-
portation. Since European countries were no longer mili-
Intereconomics 2021 | 3
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not willing to bear risks, the government should intervene 
directly.
While there was an initial underestimation of the bene-
fi ts of Airbus’s entry into the aviation market (Neven and 
Seabright, 1995), after half a century it can be consid-
ered a vital political and economic choice that produced 
benefi ts not only for Europe, but for the whole world 
– the US included. A new venture in a fast-growing in-
dustry prevented the sector from becoming a worldwide 
monopoly.
Choosing the new emerging industries
The current American-dominated oligopoly in ICTs bears 
a strong resemblance to the situation of commercial air-
craft in the 1960s. But ICTs today are much more relevant 
for current and future economic development. Not only 
are nations that depend on foreign corporations in stra-
tegic areas such as communications, satellites, data, so-
cial networks and artifi cial intelligence more vulnerable, 
but they also lose their technological sovereignty (Edler 
et al., 2020).
It is certainly not easy to identify the crucial sectors 
which will be indispensable for future economic, social 
and political life. One may wonder why shoes and cham-
pagne are less relevant than satellites and vaccines, pro-
vided that the former are as lucrative as the others. And 
the fact that the EU has a persistent commercial surplus 
with the US, even though there are no Big Tech compa-
nies located in Europe, may negate the urgency to en-
ter these high-tech sectors. Some sectors, however, are 
likely to play a paramount role in future economic com-
petitiveness.
There are many ways in which economists can contrib-
ute to identifying the strategic industries of the future. 
The fi rst is to consider the growth rate of production and 
productivity. But when statistics show that production 
starts increasing exponentially, the position of nations 
in the international division of labour has already been 
established and it is diffi cult to revert it. For this reason, 
one may need to use indicators that anticipate upcoming 
scientifi c and technological opportunities. By looking 
at the degree of dynamism and the level of pervasive-
ness of scientifi c and technological sectors, it is pos-
sible to anticipate which industries will be dominant in 
the future. The rapidly growing academic literature and 
patents often indicate the most rewarding scientifi c and 
technological areas (Meliciani, 2001). The level of perva-
siveness – defi ned by the variety of users across indus-
tries – indicates those enabling technologies that will be 
necessary for the delivery of most products, processes 
centives and political support to urge airline companies to 
purchase from Airbus rather than US producers. This led 
to a fi erce Atlantic commercial rivalry between the Euro-
pean Union and the US as the governments of each side 
supported their companies.
Airbus’s rivalry with Boeing and McDonnell Douglas led 
to intense debates in the GATT about the role of public 
funding in generating “unfair” competition. These cases 
were later discussed at the WTO, with the US government 
complaining about the European R&D subsidy to Air-
bus and the EU equally upset about the US military pro-
curement to Boeing. Eventually, focusing on the civilian 
component, Airbus managed to generate and maintain 
cheaper and more consumer-friendly airplanes. In 1994, 
Airbus sold more commercial aircraft than Boeing for the 
fi rst time and in 2016 became the fi rst in the world in the 
sector. Without Airbus, currently, the world market in civil 
airplanes would be a monopoly in the hands of a single 
US corporation, Boeing.
Aviation has witnessed a rapid acceleration in transna-
tional networks among fi rms developing high-risk in-
novations, and other knowledge-intensive industries 
have followed the same route. The question here is why 
countries ought to collaborate. From an evolutionary per-
spective, one expects that countries in cross-border col-
laborations recombine their national specialisation pat-
tern. To the extent that two countries are specialised in 
different technology/market combinations globally, they 
can collaborate in two ways. Either they recombine the 
technology in which they are specialised with the market 
in which the other country is specialised or vice versa. 
The recombination of specialisation patterns allows part-
ners to explore new technology/market trajectories col-
lectively.
When Airbus began, France had just switched its tech-
nological base from jets to turbofans, while the UK was 
already specialised in passenger aircraft (Frenken, 2000). 
Hence, previous patterns of expertise refl ect the techno-
economic specialisation of the transnational network. 
Germany, however, had lost its expertise in aircraft after 
WWII, and Spain had little experience. For these coun-
tries, Airbus provided an opportunity to leave their old 
specialisation pattern and enter a new market segment 
using state-of-the-art technology. Airbus’s entry into the 
aircraft passenger market may be conceived respectively 
as a reshuffl e of competencies for some countries and a 
developing strategy for others. Overall, governments pro-
vided the political support, the fi nancial resources and 
the expertise, but without a company, it would have been 
impossible to enter into such a complex and protected 
market. This demonstrates that when entrepreneurs are 
ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
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sion-oriented public programmes (Kattel and Mazzucato, 
2018; Mazzucato, 2018, 2019).2 Industrial alliances allow 
the facilitation of tighter cooperation and joint action 
among interested actors, bringing together a wide array 
of players in a given industry or value chain, including 
public and private players and civil society. The battery 
industry does not necessarily require large producers. 
The common knowledge base is applied to very different 
products and markets that include specialised operators, 
general-purpose users and consumers. To catch up, a 
laggard economic area should carry out a variety of ac-
tions; the EU has used several integrated instruments to 
develop prominence in this specifi c industry.
The fi rst EU decision in this area is allowing national gov-
ernments to provide up to €2.9 billion in state aid. Like 
any custom union, EU institutions are mandated to pre-
vent member state aid that could alter competition. But 
when state aid is directed towards capacity building, es-
pecially in emerging areas in which the EU is lagging be-
hind its competitors, the resources provided by national 
authorities could be advantageous to all members, and 
they deserve benevolent consideration.
The second decision is to promote the widespread col-
laboration and dissemination of knowledge generated 
across a wide range of players across countries. This 
was carried out by fostering cooperation and also by 
dedicating targeted resources within the Horizon 2020 
scheme “Next-generation batteries” and similar actions 
contemplated in Horizon Europe. These ventures will, at 
the same time, contribute to both collaborative research 
and innovation ventures as well as the dissemination of 
knowledge across players.
The third decision focuses on providing loans at negli-
gible interest rates for the battery value chain ventures 
through the European Investment Bank (EIB). Since 
2010, battery projects fi nanced by the EIB totalled €950 
million and fostered €4.7 billion of overall project costs. 
The EIB involvement has signifi cantly stepped up the 
fi nancing of all the battery value chain stages, ranging 
from R&D, raw material extraction and processing to 
battery production, e-charging infrastructure and recy-
cling.
The combination of grants, collaborative ventures, ad-
vantageous loans and regulations, together with the 
commitment to support the industry for several years, 
will hopefully make the EU a world leader in batteries. But 
2 The other EU mission-oriented public programmes are the European 
Raw Materials Alliance, European Clean Hydrogen Alliance and Cir-
cular Plastics Alliance.
and services (Evangelista et al., 2018). These areas are 
likely to have innovations that lead to organisational and 
social changes to the extent that they can be seen as the 
backbones of a new techno-economic paradigm (Free-
man and Louçâ, 2001).
Policymakers do not necessarily wait for experts’ recom-
mendations to decide where to invest. It is self-evident 
that in crucial areas, such as computers and smart-
phones, the market share of EU corporations is tiny. EU 
citizens rely on American social networks, while Europe-
an institutions have serious diffi culties obtaining regula-
tions to protect their data and ensure that proper tax is 
paid. While China has succeeded in entering new lucra-
tive fi elds such as smartphones with Huawei and social 
networks with Tik Toc, the EU has lost its competitive 
companies (such as Olivetti for computers or Nokia for 
cell phones) and not even tried to enter into the market of 
social networks. Similar problems apply for e-commerce: 
Amazon dominates the European market without be-
ing challenged, while China has maintained at least its 
internal market through Ali Baba. In new enabling sec-
tors like artifi cial intelligence, the EU investment rate is 
much below not only that of the US but also that of Japan 
and China, and, above all, it does not seem that there will 
be an EU company to gain prominence in the near future 
(Zachary et al., 2020).
We are not arguing that generating new continental pub-
lic corporations should be the only industrial policy re-
sponse to affi rm the EU presence in the world economy. 
In other cases, different attempts could be more fruitful 
to generate successful industrial capacity in emerging 
areas (for an overview, see Edler and Fagerberg, 2017). 
A case in point is the timely venture of the European Bat-
tery Alliance.
Capacity building in an extended industrial network: 
The case of the European Battery Alliance
In Europe, within this decade, where it is technologi-
cally and economically viable, everything that can be 
electrifi ed will be electrifi ed, thus making battery tech-
nology one of the most important key enablers for the 
green energy transition facilitating existing and new 
technologies. (European Commision, 2020, 6)
It is diffi cult to disagree with such a statement, especially 
since the European Commission’s target is to achieve a 
successful transition to a fossil-free society, as contem-
plated by the Green Deal.
In 2017, the European Commission launched the Euro-
pean Battery Alliance (EBA) in the spirit of one of its mis-
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such a strategy could be less effective when there is the 
need to affi rm a remarkable fresh presence in restricted 
oligopolistic markets. In such cases, if the EU wishes to 
enter into the market dominated by US Big Tech, a more 
active role is needed, namely the creation of European 
public corporations.
The need to add another arrow to EU economic 
policy instruments
The exogenous crisis represented by COVID-19 will cer-
tainly accelerate the global productive organisation. The 
EU risks falling behind unless its economic activities are 
adequately supported by government intervention and 
steered towards the emerging sectors. Horizon Europe 
will continue to be a crucial policy instrument both to 
enhance scientifi c and technological capabilities and to 
facilitate their dissemination across a rather heterogene-
ous economic fabric, going from Lisbon to Tallinn. But 
the Horizon Europe budget is comparable to one of the 
top high-tech corporations and cannot alone change the 
landscape.
The massive resources made available through the Re-
covery Fund are needed to sustain the long-term drop in 
investments in the EU, which has been especially detri-
mental for the innovative component. These resources 
will be administered by national authorities under the Eu-
ropean Commission’s supervision. However, it is less like-
ly that they will lead to large-scale intra-European techno-
logical projects.
Other industrial policy instruments are needed. We have 
suggested the launch of proper continental public corpo-
rations replicating what has been done with Airbus more 
than half a century ago. It is not diffi cult to identify those 
areas where there are greater scientifi c and technological 
opportunities and where the EU has either an advantage, 
such as green technologies and healthcare services, or 
where it is lagging behind and a gap needs to be fi lled 
with the incumbent and challenging nations, such as ICTs 
and artifi cial intelligence. These are the areas where gen-
uine European champions could hopefully sustain a solid 
continental economic recovery.
Although the endorsement of the European Council is 
certainly needed, these ventures could be initially pio-
neered by some governments only, in the hope that with 
time all EU members will join them. They will require 
building competencies, patient money, entrepreneurship 
and leadership. These are all resources that are available 
in the EU that will need to be channelled in new daring 
routes.
